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Antitrust Law-The Vertical Price Squeeze as Predatory
Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Anticompetitive conduct is an essential element of the monopolization
offense under section 2 of the Sherman Act.' The monopolist's pricing
behavior may itself be sufficiently destructive of competition to constitute
violative conduct. 2 Price behavior has long been governed by vague stan-
dards under section 2,1 but more precise rules are being developed. 4 In
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. ,5
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overlooked the
possibility of applying these developing rules to the price behavior of a
vertically integrated 6 monopolist.7 The court instead applied general defini-
tions of monopolizing conduct and in effect held that evidence of the ill
effects suffered by competitors as a result of a monopolist's pricing policies
is sufficient to support a finding of monopolization.8 Although the court
did not discuss it as such, the price behavior involved in Greyhound
was a vertical prize squeeze.9 The case can, therefore, be used to illustrate
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). The other essential element of monopolization is monopoly
power in the relevant market. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TExr, CASES 227-259 (2d ed. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 2(1976) provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop-
olize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States,. . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
Private plaintiffs may recover treble damages for violations of the Sherman Act. Id. § 15
(1976).
2. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 1, 43, 72-74. (1911).
3. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) (listing various standards that have been applied in
predatory pricing cases). See also Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
under Section 2 of the Slierman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (1975).
4. See text accompanying notes 50-66 infra.
5. 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 782 (1978).
6. Vertical integration exists when a firm operates at more than one level in the chain of
production or distribution. P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 500, at 498. See also F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 69-71 (1970).
7. It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit, which failed to see the relevance of precise
predatory pricing rules in Greyhound, has elsewhere taken the lead in embracing these devel-
oping rules. See Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
8. 559 F.2d at 499-501. The court thus appears to have erroneously applied the Sherman
Act to protect competitors rather than competition. See Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
9. See text accompanying notes 67-76 infra.
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significant possibilities for applying precise predatory pricing rules ° to
price behavior within a vertically integrated structure. Greyhound also
illustrates the need for precise rules in such cases, for the Greyhound court,
in applying general standards of conduct, failed to address adequately the
important issues raised by the case.
Plaintiff in Greyhound, a computer leasing company, buys computers
and leases them to users, competing at the leasing level with other leasing
companies and with various manufacturers who lease and sell computers. " I
Because customers generally prefer to lease computers from the Internation-
al Business Machines Corporation (IBM), the leasing companies buy
primarily from IBM. 2 IBM, however, has traditionally preferred to lease its
own computers rather than sell them, in order to minimize competition from
IBM-manufactured computers owned by others. t3 Therefore, when the
10. Predatory pricing is forbidden under the monopolization and attempt provisions of
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), under Clayton Act § 2 as amended by the Robin-
son-Patman Act, id. § 13 (1976), and under Robinson-Patman Act § 3, id. § 13a. The
issues are the same under all of these provisions. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798-99 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977); International Air
Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,720 n.10 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 943 (1976); Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 697 n.1, 726-28; Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 284 n. 1 (1977). To the extent that
Robinson-Patman doctrine has differed from the Sherman Act approach, it offers little help in
the formulation of desirable rules for predatory pricing. See generally Sherwood, Robinson-
Patman Act Primary Line Injury: Meanderings from Porto Rico to Utah-and Beyond, 16
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 304 (1969).
11. 559 F.2d at 492; see Pantages, An Introduction to Leasing, 14 DATAMATION, Aug.
1968, at 26. In order to compete with the manufacturer, a leasing company must generally
underprice the manufacturer's lease price, because the leasing company's price often does not
include support services such as maintenance and because some customers will prefer to deal
directly with the manufacturer if the prices are equal. Leasing companies are able to underprice
the manufacturer's prices because they lease the equipment for longer than its economic life
expectancy as reflected in the manufacturer's rental rates. Leasing companies thus bear the risk
of economic obsolescence, which is a function of the technological obsolescence and declining
prices that result from rapid innovation. Id. at 492 n.1; G. BROCK, THE U.S. COMPUTER
INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF MARKET POWER 177 (1975); W. SHARPE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPUTERS
498 (1969); J. SOMA, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 60-61 (1976); Gardner, Leasing: A Phenomenon
that Drains the Balance Sheets of All But IBM, 21 DATAMATION, July 1975, at 78.
12. 559 F.2d at 503 n.35; G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 177; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at
494.
13. IBM can face competition from IBM-made computers in the hands of the leasing
companies and in the sales market for used computers. This competition is potentially quite
significant because computers are virtually indestructible. 559 F.2d at 491. They are, however,
subject to obsolescence. IBM did not sell its equipment at all until it was required to do so under
the terms of a 1956 consent decree, United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 1956
Trade Cas. 68,245, at 71,123 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In order to ensure the effectiveness of this
requirement the consent decree contained a provision requiring sale terms to be "commercially
reasonable" in relation to lease terms. Id. In addition to preventing competition from IBM-
made computers, IBM's leasing-only policy hindered competing manufacturers' efforts to copy
IBM equipment and to design compatible equipment, efforts that are generally approved under
a competitive policy. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 325, 350
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
In competing with leasing companies that deal in IBM computers, IBM can use two
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leasing companies began to grow in importance in the mid-1960's,
14 IBM
became concerned about the resulting increase in sales and the proportionate
decrease in its own leases. 5 The actions taken by IBM in response to the
growth of the leasing companies formed the basis of the Greyhound com-
plaint.
From the late 1960's to 1971, when IBM introduced its fourth genera-
tion of computers, 16 IBM substantially increased the ratio of its purchase
price to its lease price. 17 This ratio, called the multiplier,18 determines the
margin within which the leasing companies must operate because they must
pay the IBM purchase price and must compete with the IBM lease price. 19
Before the multiplier was increased, leasing companies had to lease a
computer for approximately forty-two months to recover the purchase price;
methods that depend on its status as manufacturer (as distinguished from lessor). First, IBM
can price its computers so as to make unattractive the purchase of IBM computers for leasing
purposes. This is the allegation of the Greyhound case. It is arguable that such a policy would
violate the 1956 consent decree's requirement that sale terms be commercially reasonable in
relation to lease terms. The consent decree did not specify a sale/lease price ratio, however, and
the burden of proving unreasonableness would probably be a heavy one for a leasing company.
This is especially true since the decree was framed with user-purchasers in mind, not leasing
companies; independent leasing companies did not exist in 1956. See G. BROCK, supra note 11,
at 177; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 494. The second IBM method of competing with the
leasing companies is to introduce innovations that make the leasing companies' stock of
computers less attractive to customers, thus devaluing that stock. These innovations, however,
also devalue IBM's stock of leasing computers. See note 16 infra. See generally Note, Innova-
tion Competition: Beyond Telex v. IBM, 28 STAN. L. Rev. 285 (1976).
14. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 177; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 494.
15. 559 F.2d at 498. See also G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 178; W. SHARPE, supra note 11,
at 495.
According to the court of appeals, IBM preferred leasing because leasing revenues were
more constant than sales revenues, which were usually bunched in the first years after the
introduction of a new product. In addition, leasing generated particularly attractive profits after
the equipment was fully depreciated and facilitated the introduction of innovations, because the
lessee was not inhibited by a large investment in either the new or the old machines. This last
point is qualified by the fact that IBM is inhibited by a large investment in the old machines. For
other motivations, see note 13 supra. It should also be noted that IBM's profit rate on leases
was about 50% higher than that on sales. J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 61.
16. There have been four generations of IBM computers since the inception of the
industry in the early 1950's; the industry generally has followed a similar pattern. The first
generation was based on vacuum tubes, the second on transistors and the third on the integrated
circuit. The fourth generation, represented by the IBM System 370, is less clearly distinguished
from its predecessor than were previous generations and is sometimes considered part of the
third generation; it is based on a further development of the integrated circuit. See J. SOMA,
supra note 11, at 9-32. See also G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 11-21. This characteristic of the
fourth generation suggests that as the industry reaches maturity, innovation may lose some of
its generational nature and take on a steadier, more incremental character. See J. SOMA, supra
at 24, 136-37. Steadier innovation might not so severely devalue existing computers, especially
in view of the fact that upgrading present systems will be easier as a result of the incremental
character of innovation. See G. BROCK, supra at 17.
17. IBM contended that this increase did not in fact occur; the court of appeals found that
it did. 559 F.2d at 500-01 & 501 n.30.
18. Id. at 500.
19. See text accompanying notes 69-76 infra for a discussion of the vertical price squeeze.
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after the multiplier was increased, they had to lease a computer for forty-
eight months to recover the purchase price.2" The increase in the multiplier
thus made it more difficult for the leasing companies to recover their costs
on a new computer, and to this extent made the purchase of new computers
unattractive to the leasing companies. 2 Greyhound claimed that the result
was a restriction of competition in the leasing market in violation of section
2.22
IBM also increased the price at which it sold used computers. This was
accomplished in 1963 and 1964 by substantially curtailing the technological
discount that IBM had offered previously on the purchase price of used
computers. 23 This discount is a reflection of the rapidity with which com-
puters become obsolescent in the face of frequent innovation. 24 It had
previously amounted to ten percent of the original purchase price per year,
with seventy-five percent being the maximum possible reduction over time.
In 1964, however, IBM set the discount at twelve percent for the first year,
and eliminated the discount for succeeding years; this change applied to the
third generation of IBM computers, which was introduced in that year.25
Greyhound presented evidence that this change ended the previously quite
profitable practice of buying equipment late in a product cycle at a low price
that could be quickly recovered. Instead, purchases were inhibited late in a
product cycle because the leasing companies did not wish to pay relatively
high prices for older equipment that might soon be devalued by the introduc-
tion of a new generation of computers; the leasing companies' inventory
growth was therefore curtailed. Greyhound contended that the result was an
unlawful restriction of competition in the leasing market. 26
The trial court granted IBM a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's
case.27 The court of appeals reversed, holding that Greyhound had estab-
lished a prima facie case of monopolization. 28 The court concluded that
20. 559 F.2d at 500-01.
21. Id. Greyhound claimed that as a result, its access to IBM computers had been virtually
eliminated. Id. See also G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 178.
22. 559 F.2d at 500-01.
23. Id. at 499-500. IBM sold used computers to both leasing and sales dealers and sold
new computers to its lessees on purchase options. It did not, however, sell used computers
generally, preferring to retire them in favor of newer models. W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 500-
01.
24. See note 16 supra.
25. 559 F.2d at 499-500. IBM had already reduced the discount in 1963, but not as
drastically as with the 1964 change. Id.
26. Id.
27. 1972 Trade Cas. 74,205 (D. Ariz. 1972). The district judge found that Greyhound had
not established that IBM had monopoly power in a relevant market and, apparently, alternative-
ly found that IBM's conduct did not meet the monopolization requirement. Id.
28. 559 F.2d at 503. The court also held that Greyhound had established a prima facie case
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there was sufficient evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude that IBM
had monopoly power29 in the relevant market-computer leasing.30 It then
found the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the increase in the
multiplier had "severely restricted" leasing company access to new IBM
computers 31 and that the change in the technological discount had largely
eliminated the leasing companies' purchases of older equipment.32 On the
basis of these findings, the court held that a jury could find the IBM pricing
policies were "unnecessarily exclusionary" and were thus an unlawful
means of maintaining the IBM monopoly in the leasing market.
33
Greyhound relied on the contention that IBM's pricing policies had
hindered Greyhound's purchase of IBM computers; this contention was
based upon the assumption that IBM had monopoly power in the sales
market. 34 IBM contended in the court of appeals that Greyhound should
therefore be required to prove the existence of this power, but the court held
such proof to be unnecessary. 35 Although it acknowledged that Greyhound
could have proceeded on the theory that IBM had used monopoly power in
the sales market to gain an advantage in the leasing market, 36 the court held
that Greyhound was also entitled to recover upon showing that "IBM
employed exclusionary tactics to maintain an existing monopoly in the lease
market. " 37 Because of the exclusionary effects in the leasing market caused
by the IBM pricing policies, the court held that Greyhound had presented a
prima facie case of monopolization.
38
The modem view of monopolization stems from Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).
39
Prior to Alcoa, abusive or coercive behavior was an essential element of
of attempt to monopolize. Id. at 505. This aspect of Greyhound is an illustration of the Ninth
Circuit's unique attempt doctrine. See Blecher & Stegnian, Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.: A Straw in
the Wind?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 275-77, 275 nn.55 & 57 (1977); Cooper, Attempts and
Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72
MICH. L. REV. 373, 419-21 (1974).
29. 559 F.2d at 494-95. The court found this to be a close question, but "[c]onsidering the
weighty presumption in favor of a jury determination" concluded that leasing was a relevant
market. Id.
30. Id. at 496-97.
31. Id. at 501.
32. Id. at 499.
33. Id. at 502-03.
34. IBM allegedly raised its sales price relative to its lease price. To accomplish this, it
must have had the power to raise its sales price. See text accompanying notes 81-87 infra.
35. 559 F.2d at 503.
36. Id. (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
37. Id. (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)).
38. Id.
39. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). This case is commonly referred to simply as Alcoa.
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monopolization! 0 In Alcoa, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit4' decreased plaintiffs' burden of proof by holding that a
finding of monopolization could be based upon conduct that excluded
competition from the market42 and was not economically "inevitable" to a
well-run business. 43 This general formulation is the basis for more recent
definitions of monopolizing conduct, 44 including several formulated by the
Supreme Court.45
These general definitions have sometimes been applied without great
difficulty. 46 Often, however, problems can arise in distinguishing unneces-
sarily exclusionary conduct from economically inevitable conduct. 47 Such
problems are particularly severe when the conduct under attack is simply the
monopolist's pricing behavior, as is the case in Greyhound. The monopolist
is confronted with a continuous range of possible prices ;48 most of these
prices are exclusionary to some degree, 49 and all of them can be said to be
nonessential. Thus the general formulae of Alcoa and its successors offer
the monopolist little guidance in choosing from the range of possible prices
and offer the courts little guidance in judging the monopolist's choice.
A recognition of this difficulty has led to debate concerning the proper
predatory pricing standards. Professors Areeda and Turner have recently
40. See P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 11210(a). See also United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
41. The court was sitting as a surrogate for the Supreme Court under Act of June 9, 1944,
ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1970)), when the Supreme Court could
not muster its statutory quorum for the case. 148 F.2d at 421.
42. 148 F.2d at 129-30.
43. Id. at 431. It is possible to view Judge Hand's opinion as holding that when monopoly
is proved, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that its conduct cannot be condemned
because it is merely the exercise of skill, foresight and industry. See United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954). This view of monopolization has not, however, prevailed. See United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 n.7 (1966).
44. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-45 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (relying on Alcoa, holding that unnecessarily
exclusionary conduct would constitute monopolization); Cooper, supra note 28, at 390 & n.51.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (monopolizing
conduct is "the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident"). This was the definition used by the Greyhound court. 559 F.2d at 492, 498. See also
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-15 (1946).
46. Where the challenged conduct is a discrete action with consequences that can be
analytically isolated and evaluated, the general definition works well enough. The leasing-only
policy of United Shoe Machinery Corporation is an example. United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 325,350 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
47. See Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1219 (1969).
48. Price behavior is thus sharply distinguished from the discrete actions discussed at note
46 supra.
49. Any price below the monopolist's short-run profit maximization price will exclude the
firms that would enter if those high profits were in fact being made.
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offered a set of rules more clearly delineating the predatory pricing offense
by defining it in terms of objective and quantifiable criteria.5" Areeda and
Turner suggest that a monopolist's pricing practices should not be held to be
predatory without proof that its price was below its marginal cost 51 or, as a
more easily ascertainable surrogate, average variable cost.52 Limit pricing,
in which the monopolist maintains a price lower than its short-run profit
maximizing price in order to discourage new entry but does not price below
average variable cost, 53 would be allowed on the ground that such behavior
is a legitimate competitive strategy that excludes only less efficient rivals
from the market. 54 Furthermore, Areeda and Turner would allow temporary
reductions to average variable cost (reductions that may significantly deter
competition)55 on the same grounds.56
Reaction to this proposal has been varied. The courts have increas-
ingly cited the Areeda-Turner position,57 and they appear to welcome the
50. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3.
51. Id. at 709-16. Marginal cost is the incremental cost of producing an additional incre-
ment of output. Id. at 700.
52. Id. at 716-18. Variable costs are those that vary with output; they include costs for,
among other things, supplies and labor; variable costs are distinguished from fixed costs, which
do not in the short run vary with output. Id. at 700. If marginal cost is below average total cost,
pricing at marginal cost indefinitely is impossible, because the cost of overhead, including the
cost of capital, is not recovered. Therefore, a monopolist's marginal cost pricing policy may
drive an equally efficient competitor out of the market if that competitor has less "staying
power" (that is, access to capital) than the monopolist. Id. at 710. Areeda and Turner admit that
this possibility is troublesome but for several reasons see "no satisfactory method of eliminat-
ing this risk." Id. at 711. The equally efficient competitor bears losses at marginal cost pricing
only to the extent that the monopolist does. Furthermore, if any price floor above marginal cost
is imposed, less efficient firms will also be allowed to survive. In addition, the administrative
problems in determining and applying an appropriate price floor above marginal cost would be
insurmountable. Id.
Professor Williamson believes that average total cost is the appropriate price floor. Wil-
liamson, supra note 10, at 321-23. The courts, however, have increasingly followed the Turner
and Areeda position, see cases cited note 57 infra, so the following discussion will use marginal
(or average variable) cost pricing rules.
53. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 6, at 219-34.
54. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 705-06. The potential competition from possible
new entrants is valued precisely because it restrains the monopolist from reaping all possible
profits. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964). There-
fore, the monopolist should not be condemned for reacting to this competitive influence. Note,
Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 84 YALE L.J. 558, 562-63,
568-69, 576-83 (1975). Furthermore, actual competition from equally efficient firms remains
possible. See note 52 supra.
55. Temporary reductions can deter competition by teaching competitors, actual or poten-
tial, the lesson that future competition may be vigorously met by the monopolist. See Areeda &
Turner, supra note 3, at 706; Note, supra note 54, at 564-65. See also Williamson, supra note
10, at 290-93.
56. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 706-12.
57. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d
630, 638 n.34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); International Air Indus., Inc. v.
1978]
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increased certainty offered by purely cost-based rules.58 This judicial ac-
ceptance, however, has not been unreserved. Some courts may be willing to
hold that a monopolist's pricing behavior is predatory even if its prices
remain above average variable cost, if those prices are low enough to hurt
competition and the other prerequisites for predation exist in the market. 59
This approach to predatory pricing has been echoed by commentators who
argue that the relationship between the monopolist's costs and its prices is
but one factor among several to be considered in predatory pricing cases.
60
Thus it is argued that some temporary or selective price cuts are predatory,
even if the resulting prices are above average variable cost, if they signifi-
cantly deter competition.
61
The arguments against purely cost-based predatory pricing rules do not
fully answer the concerns of the Areeda-Turner position. 62 If the effect of
the monopolist's prices on its competitors rather than the relation of those
prices to its own costs is seen as the crucial factor in the existence of
predation, then the monopolist may be forced to overprice its product in
order to protect less efficient competitors. 63 If the short-run costs of the
monopolist are rejected as a guide to decision in favor of a more comprehen-
sive consideration of the long-range economic effects of the monopolist's
pricing policies, 64 then the courts are given the task of supervising prices on
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 723-25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976);
Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1059 (D.N.J. 1977).
58. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,722-23 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
59. See, e.g., id. at 724. The court did, however, express some doubt as to the validity of
this approach, and in general praised the Areeda-Turner view highly. For an approach more
antithetical to the Areeda-Turner view, see, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 299 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 510 F.2d 894, 926-28 (10th
Cir. 1975).
60. Blecher & Stegman, supra note 28; Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act:
A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1976) (reply to Areeda & Turner). See also Cooper, supra
note 28, 435-40; Note, supra note 54.
61. Note, supra note 54, at 569-70, 579. See also Williamson, supra note 10, at 292-93,
334.
62. An exception is Professor Williamson's approach. Like Areeda and Turner, William-
son rejects a wide ranging consideration of the economic environment of price behavior.
Williamson, supra note 10, at 288 n. 16. He argues, however, that the monopolist's troublesome
response to new entry is best dealt with by rules governing expansions of output rather than by
rules governing price-cutting. He proposes a rule under which a monopolist would be prohibited
from expanding its output in the short run after significant new entry. This grace period,
Williamson contends, would give the entrant a fair start toward reaching economies of scale.
After this period expires, cost-based predatory pricing rules would again be relevant. Id. at 331-
37. Although it is a significant contribution to the predatory pricing debate, this approach is not
helpful in Greyhound because Greyhound was an established company, having entered the
industry in 1962. 559 F.2d at 500 n.27.
63. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 705-06; see also F. SCHERER, supra note 6, at 216-
19; Note, supra note 54, at 576-79.
64. See Scherer, supra note 60, at 890 (rejecting short-run costs as crucial factor).
[Vol. 56
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the basis of "intrinsically speculative and indeterminate" 65 considerations,
rather than on the basis of clear, bright-line rules. As a result, every price
change by a monopolist may become the occasion for a massive antitrust
suit. Ultimately, the courts may be catapulted into the task of ongoing price
supervision.
66
Predatory pricing analysis examines conduct in its horizontal context;
that is, predatory prices are prohibited because of their effect on competition
within a single market. If, however, a monopolist operates on successive
market levels, as IBM does,67 then its behavior must be examined for
vertical implications as well. The question of what behavior, including price
behavior, within a vertically integrated structure is prohibited has been
another problem area in the law of monopolization. 68 If precise predatory
65. Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REV. 891, 897
(1976). But see Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901,902-03
(1976) (Areeda-Turner concern hinges on fear of excessive private treble damage actions and is
misplaced in context of government antitrust enforcement).
66. Although this problem is particularly acute in the context of private antitrust actions, it
is certainly arguable that the adversary model is an inappropriate vehicle for choosing welfare-
maximizing prices regardless of the identity of the plaintiff. See Williamson, supra note 10, at
288 n. 16 (long-run welfare maximizing approach advocated by Scherer evidently contemplates
supplanting antitrust enforcement with a price commission); cf. Areeda & Turner, supra note
65, at 896-97 (no "suitable, administrable rules" could be formulated to incorporate long-run
welfare maximizing factors identified by Scherer).
67. One level is the manufacturing and sales market; another level is the leasing market for
computers obtained from the sales division.
68. See Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Econom-
ic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Bork, Vertical Integration
and the Sherman Act]. Bork concludes that the antitrust laws should be entirely indifferent to
vertical considerations. Id. at 200-01. Bork continues to adhere to this view. See Bork, Vertical
Integration and Competitive Processes, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 139, 149 (J.
Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969). Contra, P. AREEDA, supra note I, 609(a), at 675 ("neither
the monopolist nor the law should be indifferent" to the extension of market power through
vertical integration).
Vertical integration may exist to achieve increased efficiencies, see F. SCHERER, supra
note 6, at 70, 86-87, or it may exist as a tool for the extension or protection of market power, see
P. AREEDA, supra 609. A monopolist that is vertically integrated can always gain a monopoly
at the second level if it wishes; for example, assuming no legal constraints, it may simply refuse
to deal with anyone on the second level except its own second level division. See Note,
Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1720 (1974) (discus-
sing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)). It is often stated that this
extension of market power is not socially detrimental because even a firm that has a monopoly
at both levels can make only one monopoly profit. This is so because the monopolist has a
single short-run profit maximization price for the product as it emerges from the second level
and the monopolist can make the entire monopoly profit at either level or can split it up however
the monopolist wishes. If the monopolist charges more than this price, output will drop, as will
the total profits for both levels. See P. AREEDA, supra 609(a), at 675; Bork, Vertical
Integration and the Sherman Act, supra at 172 n.65, 196. This analysis assumes that the product
of the first level exists in a fixed proportion in the product of the second level. See id. at 172
n.65. It has been argued that if the product of the first level is used in variable proportions at the
second level, vertical integration may increase monopoly profits. See McGee & Bassett,
Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J.L. ECON. 17, 22, 25-28 (1976) (discussing and refuting this
contention, concluding that the increased monopoly profits result from the horizontal market
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pricing rules can be applied to conduct at a single level of a vertically
integrated firm, then some of the problems may be eliminated.
The pricing behavior at issue in Greyhound was a vertical price
squeeze, although the court did not discuss it as such. 69 The squeeze is a
means by which a vertically integrated monopolist can control the profit
margin of its unintegrated second level competitors who must buy its first
level product. The monopolist's second level price puts a ceiling on the
prices of its second level competitors, because they must compete with that
price; its first level price puts a floor under the competitors' costs, because
they presumably must purchase the first level product from the monopol-
ist. 70 Thus, by manipulating its prices at the first and second levels, the
power at the second level, not vertical integration). IBM's mainframe computers are a relatively
fixed proportional input into the leasing level; for every computer that the leasing companies
lease, they generally had to buy one IBM computer. See text accompanying note 12 supra. The
proportion of IBM peripheral devices and support services (other than maintenance, which is
usually obtained from IBM) purchased by the leasing companies is quite variable, however. See
G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 177-78; W. SHARPE, supra note 11, at 494-95. Thus, if variable
proportions allow an increase in profits through vertical integration, then the greater the extent
of IBM's integration (i.e., the greater the extent of its leasing monopoly), the more monopoly
profits IBM can make. This possibility should be seriously considered, for IBM's profit rate on
peripheral devices and support services is about 50% higher than the rate on mainframe units.
Thus, if through vertical integration IBM were able to increase the proportions of these services
used by lessees, its profits might rise significantly. Even if IBM took over the leasing level
completely, however, it could not legally tie these services or products to the leasing of
mainframe computers, see, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953); therefore, this motive for extending its market power may be insubstantial.
Vertical integration may allow an increase in monopoly profits if it is necessary to a scheme
of systematic price discrimination. Such discrimination may be socially beneficial if it increases
output by lowering price to some consumers who would otherwise be unable to obtain the
product. See P. AREEDA, supra 609, at 675 & n.36; W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST
LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 100-16 (1973); Note, supra at 1729. Even if monopoly
profits cannot be increased by vertical integration, other reasons may exist for the extension of
market power by this means. If a monopolist is vertically integrated, its smaller first level
competitors may be forced to be vertically integrated also, in order to assure themselves of a
market for their product. This requirement may hinder the operation of those competitors by
increasing their capital requirements. Furthermore, if new entrants into the first level have to
enter at both levels, the additional capital required may raise significant entry barriers. P.
AREEDA, supra 609(a), at 675; J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 145-47 (1956). This
capital entry barrier argument is vigorously contested by vertical integration apologists on the
ground that the capital market will finance new entry into any market where excess profits are
being made. See, e.g., Bork, Vertical Integration and the Shennan Act, supra at 195. This
response does not completely rebut the entry barrier argument, however, because imperfec-
tions in the capital market may prevent the ready financing of new entrants. See, e.g., J. BAIN,
supra at 146; Note, supra at 1729.
69. The absence of such a discussion seems strange, because the Greyhound allegation
concerning the increase in the multiplier is explicitly an allegation of a squeeze; the Greyhound
argument concerning the change in the technological discount is also a squeeze allegation,
though less explicitly so.
70. They must purchase the first level product of the monopolist to the extent that that
product is a fixed-proportional requirement for second level production and to the extent that
the monopolist lacks competition that could supply second level needs. In other words, the
monopolist's ability to put a floor under second level costs is limited by the elasticity of the
demand curve facing the monopolist. See McGee & Bassett, supra note 68, at 25, 32 & n.37.
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monopolist can squeeze the profit margin of its second level competitors to
whatever level it wishes.71 Squeezing those profits merely to competitive
levels is socially beneficial, 72 and should therefore be lawful; 73 however, by
squeezing the profits to unremunerative levels, the monopolist can drive
competitors out of the market and gain a monopoly at the second level. It
seems clear that such a use of the squeeze to gain a second level monopoly
would constitute a section 2 violation 74 unless the squeeze were the result of
efficiencies possessed by the monopolist at the second level75 or efficiencies
resulting from vertical integration.76 Given that a squeeze to competitive
71. P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 1 609(c).
It has been argued that the vertical price squeeze is simply the use of a "deep pocket" from
one market to subsidize predatory pricing in another market, and is thus possible only if the
integrated firm is willing to forego a return on the capital that it has invested in the market in
which it is underpricing. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, supra note 68, at 198-
99; cf. Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS,
supra note 68, at 167, 172 ("price squeeze is simply another name for predatory price cutting").
This is incorrect, for the vertically integrated monopolist can set its second level price at the
profit maximization level and can set its first level price to its competitors at a point at which
they cannot meet its second level price. If the monopolist has sufficient capacity at the second
level to meet the entire demand at the profit maximization price, then it can squeeze the
unintegrated second level competitors while profit maximizing, thus making the maximum
possible return on investment.
72. Profits at the second level may be above competitive levels if the second level
competitors exercise market power, either singly or in collusion. The existence of this "remax-
imization" is not inconsistent with the fact that there is only one monopoly profit to be gained
from integration across successive market levels, because there will be a smaller demand at this
remaximizing price, and total industry profits will fall as output is further restricted. A squeeze
to competitive profit margins at the second level prevents this result and is thus socially
beneficial. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 1, 609(c); Note, supra note 68, at 1731. But cf.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (squeeze to competitive profit levels, effected by
maximum price provision in contract, per se unlawful under Sherman Act § 1 because of the
inherent dangers in all price fixing). A squeeze to competitive profit levels can be viewed as
simply a squeeze imposed by competition. An unintegrated second level firm could force
second level profits down to competitive levels through vigorous price competition. Thus, if the
monopolist forces second level prices only to competitive levels, its conduct may be viewed as
simply legitimate price competition at the second level.
73. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 437-38 (profit squeeze not
unlawful if unintegrated second level competition can make a "living profit" at prevailing
prices).
74. Id.; cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973) (refusal to
deal with second level competitors violates § 2); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Corp., 273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927) (refusal to deal with second level competitors violates
§ 2). See also Note, supra note 68, at 1754-61 (refusal to deal can be effected through vertical
price squeeze).
75. Supplying a product at a lower price because of superior efficiencies would seem to be
a variety of "growth . . . as a consequence of a superior product [or) business acumen"
allowed by the Sherman Act. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
76. See id. But see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (marketing
efficiencies created by vertical merger would have deleterious effects on competitors; merger
disallowed, in part for this reason). Conceding that such efficiencies are desirable, difficult
questions remain concerning the burden of proof as to those efficiencies. See Areeda, Struc-
ture-Performance Assumptions in Recent Merger Cases, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS,
supra note 68, at 27, 36-39 (efficiency justification for merger under Clayton Act § 7).
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profit levels is permissible, however, the formulation of standards to deter-
mine when the squeeze has become predatory is difficult.
Judge Hand examined this problem in the Alcoa case and held that a
prima facie case of a predatory squeeze had been established on the basis of
evidence that unintegrated second level firms could not make a "living
profit" by paying Alcoa's first level price and competing with its second
level price. 77 This holding would seem to permit a finding of predation on
the basis of the effect of a monopolist's prices on its competitors. The
holding, however, was premised explicitly on the assumption that Alcoa's
second level costs were equal to its competitors' costs. 78 Thus Alcoa may
alternatively be read as holding that the existence of predation, even in the
context of a vertical price squeeze, is in essence a function of the monopo-
list's prices and its costs.
79
This reading of Alcoa suggests that cost-based predatory pricing rules
may be applied to allegations of a vertical price squeeze. The monopolist's
second level prices can be examined to see if they would be predatory if the
monopolist's second level division were to purchase the first level product at
the same price that its competitors must pay. 80 Greyhound offered the Ninth
Furthermore, any desirable efficiencies must be balanced against possible anticompetitive
effects. See Note, supra note 68, at 1730-32.
77. 148 F.2d at 437-38.
78. Id. at 437.
79. The alternative reading of Alcoa is expressed in text following note 68 supra. This
reading seems inconsistent with the remainder of Alcoa. If the monopolist is able to underprice
its second level competitors and still recover its own second level costs, then the monopolist
would seem to be operating more efficiently than those competitors. This efficiency would
seem to be a variety of the "skill, foresight, and industry" that Hand viewed as acceptable
conduct. See 148 F.2d at 430. Moreover, in his discussion of the squeeze, Hand apparently
accepted the district court's position that a squeeze was impossible if Alcoa were not selling
"below the cost of [second level] production, measuring ingot price as part of the cost." Id. at
437.
80. A somewhat similar approach is advocated in Note, supra note 68, at 1760. The
analysis there advocated would also assume that the monopolist's second level division pur-
chases the first level product at the same price that the second level competitors must pay. It
would then compare the monopolist's "rate of profit from. . .sales of the final product," id.,
with the rate of profit gained from sales of the first level product to second level competitors;
the monopolist would be allowed to charge any prices that did not cause the first figure to fall
below the second.
This approach would not allow the monopolist to profit maximize at the first level while
competing at the second level. Antitrust policy, however, does not discourage such behavior.
See notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text supra. If "rate of profit from. . . sales of the final
product" refers to simply the second level rate of profit, then a monopolist that profit-
maximizes at the first level while competing at the second would almost always violate the rule,
because the competitive second level rate of profit would almost always be below the rate of
profit at the first level. If "rate of profit from. . . sales of the final product" means the rate of
profit for both levels combined, then the monopolist would still be forbidden to profit maximize
at the first level while competing at the second. The monopolist has some of its capital invested
in its competitive second level subsidiary, which receives a lower rate of return than its first
level monopoly. The total rate of profit will, therefore, be somewhat lower than the first level
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Circuit the opportunity to take such an approach. The Greyhound court,
however, did not recognize this possibility, perhaps because the court did
not recognize the case as an instance of a vertical price squeeze.
Greyhound contended that IBM had hindered Greyhound's purchase of
IBM computers by raising the purchase price relative to the IBM lease
price. 81 Thus Greyhound's case necessarily rested on the premise that IBM
had the power to control price in the manufacturing and sales market.8 2 The
court of appeals held, however, that Greyhound was not required to prove
the existence of that power.83 Greyhound was instead allowed to rely simply
on the theory, stemming from general definitions of monopolization, that
IBM had used exclusionary practices to maintain an existing monopoly in
the leasing market. 84 The IBM leasing monopoly, however, is dependent on
IBM dominance of the manufacturing and sales market, because the IBM
leasing division leases only IBM computers. Moreover, the conduct chal-
lenged by Greyhound-specifically, the adjustment of the multiplier and
technological discount-occurred at least partially in the sales market.8
Thus, IBM may be found to have monopolized the leasing market on the
basis of conduct that occurred outside the leasing market. This approach to
the analysis of a vertical squeeze is unusual, in that other cases have been
based on proof of monopoly power at the first level. 86 The Greyhound
approach, dispensing with formal proof of first level power, seems accept-
able so long as the factual existence of the squeeze is solidly proved.87
It is important to recognize, however, that a necessary implication of the
rate of profit. Thus, a monopolist's profit maximization at the first level and competition at the
second level would always violate the proposed rule.
The proposed rule goes astray in using rate of profit, rather than amount of monopoly
profit, as a basis for comparison. If the dollar amount of monopoly profit earned at both levels
from the monopolist's sale of the final product (a figure that excludes the competitive profit
made at the second level) were compared to the amount of monopoly profit made from first
level sales to second level competitors, a rule prohibiting the first figure from falling below the
second would be consistent with antitrust policy. Violation of the rule would indicate that the
monopolist was charging its competitors more than it charged its subsidiary. See text accom-
panying notes 93 & 94 infra.
81. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
82. A vertical price squeeze cannot occur in the absence of market power at the first level.
Without such power, a firm cannot raise its first level price without losing sales. Cf. Peltzman,
supra note 71, at 172 (price squeeze impossible without market power of the first level or
cheaper access to capital; the latter, however, is better analyzed as merely predatory pricing).
83. 559 F.2d at 503.
84. Id. (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,343 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dpercuriam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954)); see text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
85. The court's opinion does not make clear to what extent the sales price and the lease
price, respectively, were changed to accomplish the change in the multiplier. See 559 F.2d at
500-01.
86. E.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 438.
87. "Greyhound was not required to prove the source of IBM's power to do what
Greyhound's evidence indicated IBM in fact did." 559 F.2d at 503.
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Greyhound ruling is that IBM had monopoly power in the sales market. The
existence of such power, though Greyhound was not required to prove it, is
a premise of further analysis of IBM's squeeze of the leasing companies.
Accepting that IBM was squeezing the leasing companies, the court
was further required to decide whether the squeeze was predatory. The court
held that Greyhound had established a prima facie case of predation on the
basis of evidence that Greyhound had sharply reduced its purchases of new
equipment when the multiplier was raised and largely ceased buying older
equipment when the technological discount was reduced.88 Thus, the court
relied entirely on evidence of the effect of IBM's pricing behavior on
competitors in holding that behavior predatory.
89
Greyhound might be seen as simply an application of the Alcoa
"living profit" principle. The Greyhound court's disregard of IBM's costs,
however, is a disturbing departure from the Alcoa approach. The Grey-
hound court did not assume, as Judge Hand did in Alcoa, that IBM's
second level costs were equal to those of its second level competitors. Nor
did the Greyhound court state that IBM could rebut the inference of
predation with evidence of its own costs. The failure of the court of appeals
to mention this possibility raises the question whether the court realized that
a determination of IBM's leasing division costs is central to the issue of
predation. 90 If the court did not recognize the existence of this crucial issue,
there is a danger that in the future the court may permit even weaker
evidence to constitute a prima facie case of monopolization. Thus, by
relying on general definitions of monopolization, 91 the court may overlook
crucial issues and allow unmeritorious cases to reach the jury. This is the
specter raised by Greyhound.
Despite the failure of the court to perceive it as such, Greyhound offers
an opportunity for a rigorous approach to the analysis of a vertical price
squeeze through the application of precise predatory pricing rules to a
vertically integrated structure. The question raised by applying cost-based
rules to the Greyhound vertical squeeze is whether the IBM lease price
88. See id. at 499-501.
89. In its holding on the technological discount, the court also relied to a degree on
evidence, in the form of internal IBM memoranda, that IBM had a subjective intent to
monopolize. Id. at 499. Intent has been a dead issue in the law of monopolization since Judge
Hand laid it to rest in Alcoa. 148 F.2d at 431-32. The Greyhound court's resurrection of it may
simply be a spillover from the court's discussion of the attempt claim, 559 F.2d at 504-05, since
specific intent is relevant in attempt cases. See generally sources cited at note 28 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
91. The court relied generally on the Grinnell definition of monopolizing conduct, United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see note 45 supra, finding that IBM's
actions represented the willful maintenance of monopoly power. 559 F.2d at 498. As already




would be below the IBM leasing division's average variable cost if that
division's cost for an IBM computer were the same as that of the leasing
companies. 92 If the IBM leasing division "pays" the same price as the
leasing competitors and the IBM lease price is below the leasing division's
average variable cost, then Greyhound has established a clear case of
predation. If the leasing division remains profitable because it "pays" less
for computers than do the leasing companies, then IBM's adjustment of the
multiplier and technological discount emerges as an instance of systematic
price discrimination that offers no welfare gain to society93 unless the
discrimination reflects efficiencies of vertical integration. 94 In the absence
of such efficiencies, this discrimination should constitute a section 2 viola-
tion.
95
If the IBM sales division charges the same price to the IBM leasing
division and the leasing companies, and the IBM lease price is not less than
the leasing division's average variable cost, then several possibilities re-
main. IBM may be squeezing the leasing companies only to competitive
profit levels,96 or IBM may be more efficient at the leasing level than the
leasing companies and therefore able to underprice them. 97 In either event,
IBM should not be held to have monopolized the leasing market. 98 A
contrary conclusion would require IBM to adhere to an "umbrella price"
99
in order to give rivals a share of monopoly profits or to protect them from
their own inefficiency. IBM may also be able to underprice its second level
competitors because of efficiencies resulting from vertical integration. IBM
should probably be allowed to reap the benefit of these efficiencies, as a
primary goal of the antitrust laws is to promote the efficient allocation of
resources. 
100
92. This approach entails a difficult problem of attributing joint or common costs among
the divisions of the monopolist. See Note, supra note 68, at 1760 & n.220. Nevertheless,
despite its difficulties, this approach seems the most reliable way to analyze a vertical price
squeeze. Id.
93. For a discussion of price discrimination through vertical integration, see note 68
supra.
94. But see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 256 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd,
384 U.S. 563 (1966); Note, supra note 54, at 558 n.5. See also Note, supra note 68, at 1728 n.52.
96. Greyhound claimed damages based on a 30% profit margin. 559 F.2d at 507 & n.40
(derived).
97. There is no indication in the record to support this position.
98. See notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
99. An umbrella price is a price so high that it encourages entry even by less efficient
firms. See Note, supra note 54, at 561-62.
100. See notes 75 & 76 supra.
A final possibility is that if consumers prefer to lease directly from IBM, then IBM can
charge a premium price that allows it to compete with the leasing companies at a higher price
than they can charge. Therefore, IBM can cut its lease price to the leasing division's average
variable cost (a dollar figure that does not include the accumulated good will that gives IBM its
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If predatory pricing policy is not analyzed exclusively on the basis of
cost-based rules, other factors may be relied upon to support Greyhound's
prima facie case. 10 1 The Greyhound court failed to examine adequately the
market conditions that would make a predatory squeeze profitable for IBM,
when such an examination would have strengthened its holding.
The squeeze in Greyhound was directed at one of the submarkets of the
computer systems industry, 0 2 the leasing market. The pattern of competi-
tion in the industry has been for IBM to compete vigorously when it is
challenged in single submarkets while reaping greater profits in those
submarkets in which it faces little competition. 10 3 IBM has thereby gained a
reputation as "hyperaggressive,'1' 4 which may have discouraged invest-
ment in IBM's competitors I 5 and deterred competition in all of the indus-
try's submarkets.
Discouraging entry into single submarkets is important to IBM because
a major barrier to entry into the manufacture of mainframe computers is the
necessity of entering a number of other submarkets simultaneously in order
to market a computer system. 106 If strong, independent companies were to
develop in the various submarkets, entry into mainframe manufacturing
might well be easier. 07 The leasing market is particularly important in this
regard because in the absence of leasing companies to market the computers
of various manufacturers' 0 8 a new manufacturer must make a large capital
premium status), and the leasing companies would have to price below their average variable
cost to stay competitive, assuming equal costs at the leasing level, because they lack IBM's
premium value. This possibility presents a difficult problem for predatory pricing analysis. The
prices are not predatory under strict cost-based rules; yet if these prices are permitted, an
entrenched monopolist may obtain an almost impregnable position. See Sherwood, supra note
10, at 341 n. 194; Note, supra note 54, at 573 n.78, 574 n.84. One solution would be to deduct the
premium value, assuming that can be calculated, see id. at 573 n.78, from the monopolist's price
before applying the cost-based predatory pricing rules.
101. The market must be examined to determine the existence of the prerequisites of
predation, such as substantial entry barriers. See Scherer, supra note 60, at 890.
102. The industry is composed of a number of submarkets, including mainframe manufac-
ture, peripheral devices, maintenance, software, and distributional submarkets such as leasing.
See generally J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 129-45.
103. W. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 229 (1970). For example,
IBM engaged in a vigorous campaign against the newly developed manufacturers of peripheral
devices designed for IBM computers and at the same time raised its mainframe prices, See
generally G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 132-34, 173-77.
104. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 63.
105. Id. at 62-63; see Gardner, supra note 11, at 82-86.
106. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 62, 231; J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 41-43; cf. note 68
supra (entry barriers raised by dual entry requirement resulting from vertical integration).
107. See G. BROCK, supra note II, at 60-61, 231.
108. Even though the leasing companies do not now generally handle computers by other
makers, they might do so in the future, when both they and the other manufacturers are




investment in a stock of computers for leasing. 109 This requirement is in fact
the major capital entry barrier into the manufacturing market. 110 Thus, by
restricting the growth of strong leasing companies, IBM maintains signifi-
cant capital entry barriers in the manufacturing market.
These additional and more subjective factors support the conclusion
that IBM violated the antitrust laws by engaging in a socially undesirable
price squeeze. It should be remembered, however, that when predatory
pricing analysis is opened to considerations beyond the monopolist's costs
the advantages of the cost-based rules are diminished, and the analysis leans
toward the "intrinsically speculative and indeterminate" 111 approach such
rules are designed to avoid.
The problem of determining standards for a monopolist's price behav-
ior is compounded when that behavior occurs on successive market levels,
as in the Greyhound case. Clear and precise standards are needed to guide
the monopolist and the courts. Such standards are available in the form of
cost-based predatory pricing rules, which can be applied to the vertically
integrated monopolist. The court of appeals in Greyhound overlooked the
possibility of such an application, relying on general definitions of mono-
polization to find a prima facie case of monopolization. The court over-
looked or ignored the crucial issue of IBM's costs as a measure of the
propriety of its prices; IBM's potential defenses based on cost considera-
tions went unnoticed, leaving open the unhappy possibility that even weaker
cases will be approved in the future. The Greyhound court thus decided, for
badly flawed reasons, to enter the economic thicket of judicial supervision
of IBM's pricing policies.
MICHAEL L. BALL
Criminal Procedure-Pen Registers: Compelling
Third Party Assistance Under the All Writs Act
A pen register is a mechanical device that records the outgoing num-
bers dialed on a monitored telephone, but that does not overhear oral
communications or record whether a call is actually completed.1 Because
109. G. BROCK, supra note 11, at 57-60.
110. Id.;J. SOMA, supra note 11, at 41.
111. Areeda & Turner, supra note 65, at 897.
1. A pen register is attached to a telephone line usually at a central telephone office. In
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